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Onslow, ready to act as a football hooligan to further Lords' 
reform, who pointed the moral when he said:
' ... this is a perfect example of why this House should be properly 
reformed. When it is properly reformed, we can use the powers that we 
have with legitimacy and pride rather than be blackmailed because we 
are told that we are all idiots of hereditary Peers.'
The Bill to abolish the right of hereditary peers to be members 
ot the House of Lords was introduced in the House of Commons 
on 19 January. In a statement to both houses, the government 
confirmed that it was minded to accept an amendment to the 
Bill, when it reached the Lords, to temporarily reprieve some 
hereditary peers until there is a fully reformed second chamber. 
That depended, however, 'on the extent to which the normal 
conventions relating to the government's legislative programme 
are being observed'   a euphemism for not blocking the Bill. 
(This amendment to reprieve 92 hereditary peers has now been 
passed in the Lords.) The statement accompanied a White Paper 
setting out the government's proposals for Lords' reform both in 
the short term (the transitional house) and longer-term reform, 
which would be considered by a Royal Commission to report by 
the end of 1999 on the role, function and composition of a
second chamber. The terms of reference make it clear that the 
House of Commons must remain the pre-eminent chamber of 
Parliament. Ominously, the government, in setting out its o\vn 
views on the powers of a reformed second chamber, considers 
that they should be reduced, rather than restricting their 
exercise by 'institutionalising the understandings' under which 
the house now operates   understandings which were evolved 
precisely because the house was unreformed. In other words the 
government does not envisage that a second chamber endowed 
with greater legitimacy should act as a better check on the 
Commons. The Commons will still normally be dominated by 
the government formed from the party with a majority of MPs, 
unless there is electoral reform more radical than that proposed 
by the Jenkins Commission. Plus $a change, plus c'est la meme 
chose. ©
Professor Gabriele Ganz
Faculty of Law, Southampton University
Misplaced trust?
by Peter Willoughby
The trust concept has been used for more than 800 years as a 
mechanism to protect and conserve family wealth. However, in 
recent years, failure to set up trusts correctly and to administer 
them scrupulously has resulted in litigation. Professor Peter 
Willoughby outlines the dangers and pitfalls of setting up and 
administering trusts.
O ver the last 30 years there has been widespread and increasing use of trusts as a way of holding personal wealth. The trust concept is one with more than 800 
years of development, originally in Lngland but more recently in 
many other jurisdictions. Trusts have been created for many 
reasons but generally the overriding need is the protection and 
conservation of family wealth. One of the most important 
advantages of a trust is that it provides a convenient and flexible 
way of ensuring that the benefit of assets is enjoyed by members 
of a family through more than one generation, without the 
inconvenience, publicity and expense that can occur where it is 
necessary to obtain a grant of probate or letters of administration 
or the equivalent, in several jurisdictions, on the death of a 
wealthy person. It may be that other advantages can be obtained,
such as the mitigation of tax liabilities and the sheltering of family 
assets from potential creditors.
Unfortunately in more recent times trusts have all too 
frequently been marketed as 'products' by banks, accountancy 
firms and even lawyers, without proper attention to the essential 
legal requirements of a valid trust. In many instances, aggressive 
marketing by people who have not understood the need to set up 
trusts correctly and then to administer them scrupulously has 
resulted in litigation which is often multi-jurisdictional and very 
expensive. The practical implications of matters such as heirship 
and creditors' rights, together with the dangers of retaining direct 
or indirect control in the person creating the trust, have been 
underestimated. This has resulted in challenges by creditors, 
disinherited heirs, former spouses and revenue authorities.
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In the case of a trust which was set up to protect assets from 
creditors, the challenge normally occurs within a year or so of 
the creation of the trust. In the case of other claims, these 
usually occur when the person who created the trust, the settlor, 
dies. In the latter case this may, of course, be many years after 
the trust was created. For example, in one recent case in New 
Zealand, the litigation did not start until more than 40 years 
after the creation of the trust. In a recent case in England the 
litigation occurred more than 30 years after the creation of the 
trust, even though the problems which gave rise to the litigation 
should have been noticed much sooner because they arose from 
failure to draft the trust in the way the settlor had intended.
WHAT IS A TRUST?
In order to understand why there have been so many 
problems with trusts in recent times, it is necessary to go back 
to first principles and define the essence of a trust. The leading 
text on the law of trusts is Underbill and Hayton Law of Trusts and 
Trustees. David Hayton QC defines a trust as:
' ... an equitable obligation, binding a person (who is called a 
trustee) to deal with property over which he has control (which is called 
the trust property), Jbr the benefit of persons (who are called the 
beneficiaries ... ), of whom he may be one, and any one of whom may 
enforce the obligation.'
It must be stressed that for a valid trust to exist, the control, 
and nearly always the ownership, of the trust property must be 
transferred to the trustees. Many settlors creating trusts are 
understandably reluctant to transfer control of their assets to 
trustees who are unknown to them. Moreover, where the trustee 
is a bank trust company the settlor may be alarmed not only 
because control has to be transferred but also because it has to 
be transferred to trustees based on the other side of the world 
whose trust officers are unknown to the settlor. The commercial 
solution to this problem is sometimes to 'touch wood', ignore 
the requirement of control and allow the settlor to have an 
express power to deal with the trust assets or to direct the 
trustees as to how the trust assets are to be administered. 
Alternatively, a mechanism may be provided whereby the settlor 
retains indirect control through a protector (sometimes called an 
'appointor' or a 'guardian') or by having control over companies, 
which own the trust assets with the shares of those companies 
held by the trustees. If the settlor then has power under the trust 
deed to dismiss the trustees he will have effective control over 
the trust assets. An arrangement of this sort is most unlikely to 
survive a challenge on the basis that either the trust is a sham, 
that is to say not a true trust but some other legal relationship, 
such as a nominee arrangement, or on the basis that the settlor 
did not understand what was required of a true trust and 
therefore had no intention to create a trust. Sometimes, it is also 
clear that the trustee did not understand the true nature of a 
trust either!
A challenge to the validity of a trust on either of the above 
grounds can often be made on the basis that the trust was a 
formal sham from the outset, (i.e from the terms of the trust 
deed it is apparent that the trustees were never intended to have 
control), or that the trust has become a sham in substance 
because it is apparent from the trust records that all key 
decisions have been taken by the settlor or someone, such as a 
protector, acting on his/her instructions. The position will often 
be made worse by marketing documentation issued by theJ O J
trustees at the time the trust was created that shows that the 
trustees were happy to leave control of the trust assets with the 
settlor, who is frequently referred to in memoranda of meetings 
and telephone calls as 'the client'.
It is understandable for a bank trustee to refer to a settlor who 
has been a long-standing customer of the bank as 'the client' 
whenever decisions affecting the trust assets are taken after 
consulting the settlor. Nevertheless, this is not good practice, 
because the trustee owes its legal obligations to the beneficiaries 
and not to the settlor. It will often also be apparent that the 
settlor frequently refers to the trust as 'his trust' or 'my trust', 
when in reality the persons entitled to the enjoyment of the trust 
property are not the settlor but the beneficiaries. This implies 
that the settlor does not understand the nature of a trust. In 
general even when the settlor is also a beneficiary it is safer to 
refer to 'the family trust'.
Sometimes the position is made even worse because the 
settlor has been led to believe that the family trust is a form of 
'living will'. Under this sort of arrangement, the settlor iso o '
allowed to have complete control over the trust assets during his 
lifetime, with the trustees only exercising control of the trust 
assets on the settlor's death. Very often correspondence with the 
trustees will record the settlor as referring to the family trust as 
'my will'. Where records show that this is the situation not only 
will it usually be possible to have the trust set aside as a 
substantive sham, it will also be apparent that the settlor never 
understood the nature of a trust because he thought that the 
trust was a will.
PITFALLS OF 'PRODUCT' MARKETING
... trusts have all too frequently been marketed as 'products' 
by banks, accountancy firms and even lawyers, without 
proper attention to the essential legal requirements of a valid 
trust. In many instances, aggressive marketing by people who 
have not understood the need to set up trusts correctly and 
then to administer them scrupulously has resulted in 
litigation which is often multi-jurisdictional and very 
expensive.
The law requires a bona fide intention to create a trust if there 
is to be a valid and enforceable trust relationship between the 
trustees and the beneficiaries. If, when the settlor executed the 
trust he thought that the trust deed was a will, he cannot have 
had any true intention of creating a trust. There have been a 
number of cases where arrangements of this sort have been 
attacked on the basis that what the settlor executed was an 
invalid will   invalid, that is, because the document had not been 
executed in accordance with the formalities required for a will   
result with the that there is, neither a valid trust nor a valid will, 
and the so-called trust assets will pass on intestacy on the 
settlor's death.
LETTERS OF WISHES AND PROTECTORS
As a consequence of the need to ensure that control is with the 
trustees, but at the same time to give the settlor comfort by 
giving him a means of influencing the administration of a trust, 
it has become common practice to use letters of wishes and 
protectors. A letter of wishes should never be a legally-binding 
document but merely a list of guidelines for the trustees, in the
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hope that they will take them into account when administering 
the trust. Provided that a letter of wishes is no more than that 
there should he no problems. In practice, however, some letters 
of wishes are drafted in mandatory terms and even where this is 
not so it is quite often the case that the trustees do not exercise 
any independent discretion but blindly follow the wishes of the 
settlor as set out in the letter of wishes. Where this is so the trust 
will, at worst, be in danger of being set aside as a sham. At best 
the trustees will be guilty of breach of trust.
There are many problems which can arise from letters of 
wishes, usually after the death of the settlor when the next 
generation starts to take an active interest in the way in which 
the trustees are administering the trust. Disappointed relatives 
who want to attack the validity of the trust may argue that the 
settlor has continued to direct the administration of the trust 
assets from his grave and that therefore the trust is a sham. 
Other beneficiaries may claim that the trustees have not 
administered the trust in accordance with the letter of wishes 
and may claim that it is, in substance, part of the terms of the 
trust and therefore, enforceable as such. It should not, 
therefore, be assumed that a letter of wishes is a wholly 
satisfactory solution for a settlor who wishes to continue to 
influence decisions of the trustees.
A common alternative to a letter of wishes is the appointment 
of a protector. Very often a protector will be given power to 
appoint new trustees and the right to be consulted by the 
trustees before key decisions are taken in relation to the 
administration of the trust assets. Until recently it had always 
been assumed that a protector owed duties to the settlor and 
that in practice the protector's function was usually one of 
liaising between the settlor and the trustees. As a result of recent 
court decisions, however, it is now clear that a protector owes a 
duty to the beneficiaries to exercise his powers for their benefit 
and not for the benefit of the settlor. It follows that, in the event 
of a family dispute, the exercise by a protector of his power 
under the family trusts mav be challenged if the result is to
J J O
benefit the settlor or one group of beneficiaries at the expense 
of another.
DANGERS IN DESIGNER TRUSTS
A jurisdiction is entitled to create whatever institutions it 
chooses, but it is not entitled to assume that other 
jurisdictions must necessarily recognise what has been done as 
creating a trust. For example, designer trust legislation which 
allows a settlor to retain control of the trust assets is, in reality, 
providing for a nominee arrangement or an agency but not a 
trust. To continue to call such an institution a trust is 
misleading. It should be appreciated that these so-called 
designer trusts will not be accepted as trusts in other 
jurisdictions where, for example, the trust assets are physically 
situated or where the settlor, beneficiaries or trustees are 
physically present.
settlor has no clear idea of how a trust should be set up and 
administered.
CERTAINTY AND INTENTION
Reference has already been made to the importance of the 
settlor of having intention to create a trust. This is related to the 
issue of certainty, which traditionally involves the need for 
certainty of the terms of a trust, certainty as to the property 
which is to be held by the trustees and certainty as to the 
beneficiaries who are to enjoy the benefit of the trust property. 
All too often there is failure to appreciate the importance of 
these fundamentals, both by prospective trustees and by 
prospective settlors. A recent case from the Isle of Man 
illustrates the problems that can flow from failure to observe the 
fundamentals and ensure that those creating the trust 
understand what is required of a trust. The case concerned eight 
Sikhs who wished to invest £20,000 each in a joint deposit with 
the Isle of Man branch of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International. For some reason they were advised to use an off- 
the-shelf trust (never good practice) which showed the only 
identified beneficiary as the International Red Cross. Two of the 
Sikhs were trustees, and the trust deed gave them power to 
nominate other beneficiaries. The intention, presumably, was 
that they would nominate themselves and the other six Sikhs as 
beneficiaries. It seems that that was not explained to them, 
although there was never any intention "of benefiting the 
International Red Cross or indeed of informing them their 
existence as a beneficiary. The reason for including the 
International Red Cross was to ensure that there was one 
identified beneficiary with the identities of the eight Sikhs^ o
remaining confidential. Unfortunately the bank (BCCI) failed 
and the eight Sikhs lost their joint deposit. The Isle of Man, 
however, set up a compensation scheme which allowed £15,000 
to be paid to each claimant. The eight Sikhs assumed that they 
would each receive £15,000. Unfortunately the effect of the 
rules of the compensation scheme was to allow only one claim 
to be made by the trustees on behalf of the trust, which was 
treated as a single claimant. It is almost certain that the eighto o
Sikhs would never have agreed to a trust in the form adopted if 
the possible result had been properly explained to them. The 
report of the decision does not make clear what the two trustees 
did with the one claim of £15,000. If the trust was valid thev 
presumably passed it to the International Red Cross, which was 
never the intention when the trust was created. But was the trust 
invalid because the International Red Cross was not a genuine 
beneficiary and no other beneficiaries had been appointed?
The case of the eight Sikhs should not be regarded as isolated. 
There are many thousands of these so-called Red Cross trusts, 
which became fashionable in the 1970s in Hong Kong and 
elsewhere. Many are probably not trusts at all, some are trusts 
which have either given, or will give, rise to serious consequences 
when the settlor dies. In the case of British subjects, there may 
be horrendous inheritance tax liabilities which date back to the 
date when the trusts were established.
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Increasingly it now appears that the use of letters of wishes 
and protectors is not really a substitute for choosing a competent 
trustee who will provide a first class service. Unfortunately 
modern marketing pressures can make it difficult for prospective 
settlors to know how to choose a good trustee, particularly if the
TRUST ADMINISTRATION
References have already been made to the importance of 
proper trust administration. The law imposes a duty on trustees 
to safeguard trust assets, to provide information for beneficiaries 
when requested, and to keep proper accounts and be prepared
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to produce their accounts when asked for by beneficiaries. The 
areas of trust administration which have given rise to the greatest 
problems have concerned the proper investment of trust assets 
and the duties of trustees where the sole or main trust asset is a 
majority shareholding in a family business.
The duties of trustees administering investments vary little
O
between jurisdictions. Generally speaking, the investment 
powers of trustees must be exercised as a prudent man of 
business would exercise them. The traditional approach has 
been to expect trustees to preserve the capital of the trust fund, 
but the effects of inflation from the f 970s until the mid 1990s 
has required trustees to exercise prudent portfolio risk 
management to ensure that the fund is not eroded by inflation. 
This involves investment in equities as well as in fixed-interest 
investments.
There are often situations in which a settlor will wish to 
continue to exercise control over the investment of trust funds. 
There is authority for saying that provided that the trust deed is 
explicit, the retention of such a power by the settlor will not 
invalidate the trust. It will, however, be important to ensure that 
any other powers retained by the settlor do not result in a 
situation in which the settlor is in overall control of the way in 
which the trust is administered. That could result in the trust 
being set aside as a sham.o
Trusts which have as a main asset a majority shareholding in a 
family business present particular problems for trustees. The 
probability is that the business will be run by members of the 
family and not by the trustees. If the members of the family who 
are running the business commit the business to a speculative 
venture which fails and results in major depletion of the value of 
a trust assets, the question that will then arise is whether a 
beneficiary can sue the trustees for breach of trust. There have 
been cases in which litigation against trustees for breach of trust 
has been successful, where the trustees have knowledge of the 
existence of a speculative venture but have failed to question its 
suitability. It seems clear that in this sort of situation a trustee 
cannot escape all responsibility' for what proves to be a disastrous 
business decision taken by the board of directors of a family 
business. The cases do not, however, decide that a trustee must 
always step in and interfere but merely that a trustee cannot 
stand idly by, while speculative decisions are taken. Usually, a 
trustee in this sort of situation will seek to include wide 
exclusion clauses in the trust deed, to the effect that they will not 
be responsible for losses to a business unless they have actual 
knowledge of dishonesty by those running it. The scope of such 
a clause is uncertain. On balance, even in the absence of 
knowledge of dishonesty', a professional trustee will probably be 
held to account where it has remained entirely passive and not 
taken steps to ensure a regular flow of information from the 
board of directors.
The more general question of the validity of clauses in trust 
deeds which exempt trustees from liability is also uncertain, ft 
seems clear that a clause can never exempt a trustee from 
dishonesty and in some jurisdictions it is not possible for a 
trustee to exclude liability- for recklessness or 'gross' negligence. 
This seems to be the position in the United States, Jersey and 
Guernsey, and Scotland. In these jurisdictions it appears that a 
widely   drawn exemption clause may be set aside as being 
repugnant to the trust concept or, in the case of Jersey and
Guernsey, as contrary to the local trust laws. In other words, the 
nature of trusteeship is such that a high level of competence is 
inherent in the office and to seek exemption from liability' for 
recklessness or gross negligence is not permitted by the law.
There are further problems with exemption clauses in trust 
deeds, indeed with any other clauses in a trust deed, which 
benefit a trustee. A professional trustee is under a duty to ensure 
that a prospective settlor fully understands the effect of clauses 
which benefit the trustee and which therefore are to the possible 
detriment of the beneficiaries. A prudent professional trustee 
entitled to remuneration under the terms of the trust deed 
should always ensure that a prospective settlor has obtained 
independent legal advice before executing the trust deed. It is 
very unwise for both a prospective settlor and a trustee to omit 
this step with the short-term object of saving costs.
DESIGNER TRUST LEGISLATION
The failure of many trusts to withstand litigation has resulted 
in a number of small jurisdictions enacting trust legislation 
which is designed to overcome the need for meeting the strict 
legal requirements for the creation of valid trusts. This is an 
unfortunate development. A jurisdiction is entitled to create 
whatever institutions it chooses, but it is not entitled to assume
FURTHER READING
See Amicue Curiae, Issue 17, May 1999, p.3 1, for an article on 
sham trusts by Naomi Lawton.
that other jurisdictions must necessarily recognise what has been 
done as creating a trust. For example, designer trust legislation 
which allows a settlor to retain control of the trust assets is, in 
reality, providing for a nominee arrangement or an agency but 
not a trust. To continue to call such an institution a trust is 
misleading. It should be appreciated that these so-called 
designer trusts will not be accepted as trusts in other 
jurisdictions where, for example, the trust assets are physically 
situated or where the settlor, beneficiaries or trustees are 
physically present. If these other jurisdictions are orthodox trust 
jurisdictions the designer trust will be required to meet the 
exacting legal requirements of orthodox trust laws.
Another development in relation to designer trust law 
concerns the misuse of the term 'asset protection'. Trusts have 
always been concerned with asset protection, but over the last 20 
vears this term has been hijacked by a number of American law 
firms to mean debtor protection or, perhaps more accurately, 
creditor-defrauding trusts. It is regrettable that a number of 
jurisdictions, notably the Cook Islands, have devised legislation 
which is specifically designed to attract debtor-protection trusts. 
This normally involves very short limitation periods within 
which a creditor must bring an action if the trust is to be 
successfully set aside. Any one who is concerned to ensure that 
assets are preserved from attacks from future creditors would be 
wise to have other reasons for setting up a trust and also to use 
a reputable jurisdiction which has not gone out of its way to 
attract trusts designed to frustrate creditors. It is now the 
position that where certain jurisdictions are used there is a 
presumption that the trust was set up to avoid creditors.
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CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that a trust, properly implemented and 
administered, provides a flexible and valuable means of 
safeguarding assets and providing continuity for family assets 
without the disruption that the death of the head of the family 
can cause. Nevertheless, the requirements of the trust concept 
must be more clearly understood than has been the case over the 
last three decades. Attempts to achieve ends which are 
inconsistent with the fundamentals of a valid trust should be 
resisted, however great the commercial pressure to distort them. 
Where possible, existing family trust structures should be
reviewed regularly to ensure that those involved understand what 
is required of a valid trust. While there are ways in which a 
settlor can continue to have some indirect influence over the 
administration of trust assets by trustees, the ultimate control 
must always remain with the trustees. It should be recognised 
that this is so as a matter of substance and not form alone.
Professor Peter Willoughby OBE, JP, LLM, TEP
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The selection of arbitrators
by Charles Molineaux
The January 1999 issue of Amicus Curiae carried an article by David Winter on 
'The Selection of Arbitrators', to which a response by Dr K V S K Nathan 
('The selection of arbitrators: another view') was published in Issue 17, May 1999. 
The following letter by Charles Molineaux has been received by the editor.
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These articles consider a very important aspect of 
international arbitration. While there are valuable points in 
Dr Nathan's article, two comments are controversial indeed.
First, Mr Winter had made the observation that a most 
important point in relation to the selection of arbitrators is that 
an arbitrator must be 'psychologically comfortable' with parties 
from other countries, understanding their culture and method of 
presentation. This comfort, he suggests, might be evidenced by 
travel and an interest in other cultures.
Surprisingly, Dr Nathan responds by saying that 'most 
Europeans' when they live abroad tend to interface with the 
locals only 'infrequently at formal occasions if at all'. He 
continues: 'Those who have lived abroad can develop a strong 
bias against the indigenous people. Generally they do not trust 
them ... '. Then, escalating the rhetoric, he makes the
' O '
accusation that there is a 'higher standard of proof often 
demanded by international arbitrators from a party and 
witnesses from a developing country'.
Perhaps this charge is too outrageous to warrant discussion. 
On its face it urges that one-time colonial attitudes toward the 
natives are not a thing of the past, but of the present. If it were 
taken seriously, which it should not be, it would mean that the 
growth of international arbitration, to facilitate development and 
trade, is misconceived and based on a false expectation of an 
honourable effort to search for truth and resolve disputes 
according to law.
(As an anecdotal comment, this writer participated in two 
substantial cases just within the past year in which unanimous 
awards in favour of the developing country entities were 
rendered by Western, or first-world-dominated tribunals.)
The other point warranting discussion is the charge by Dr 
Nathan that the use of a list of arbitrators as a basis for tribunal 
selection to be agreed to by both parties (as contrasted with the 
party-appointed arbitrator approach) is 'an attempt to weaken 
the autonomy of the parties'. This is simply silly. The parties are 
free to write up whatever procedure they like. One distinct 
advantage of a list procedure (as set forth, for example, in the 
new international rules of the American Arbitration Association) 
is that both parties have a voice in the selection of all three 
arbitrators. Assuming a carefully-developed list, prepared by the 
arbitral institution or by the parties themselves, and assuming 
that counsel for the parties do their job in vetting that potential 
arbitrator list, this is a procedure which can instil more 
confidence in the parties in the arbitral process generally and in 
the tribunal itself in particular. Nor is there any basis for the 
further charge that a list procedure 'enables the stronger party in 
terms of power and influence to prevail in the selection of 
arbitrators'. How this would happen is not explained.
The list procedure avoids the problem of defining the attitude 
of the party-appointed arbitrator (i.e. is he to be truly neutral or 
a second-tier advocate for the party appointing him?), avoids the 
problem of the proper scope of the 'interview' or 'beauty 
contest' conducted by the party to select the party-appointed 
arbitrator, and avoids the possibility of leaks, or the suspicion of 
leaks, to the appointer during the process. ®
Charles Molineaux
Construction lawyer and international arbitrator; counsel, Wickwirc Gavin, 
Washington DC
The author also maintains an office at the chambers of Geoffrey 
Hawker, 46 Essex Street, London.
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